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TWO MODELS  
OF DISESTABLISHED MARRIAGE
Vaughn Bryan Baltzly
A growing number of theorists have observed that the response to the same-sex marriage controversy most congruent with basic liberal principles is neither 
the retention of the institution of marriage in its present form, nor its extension 
so as to include same-sex unions along with heterosexual ones, but rather the 
disestablishment of marriage.1 On this proposal, the state—rather than taking a 
stand on the controversial question as to which types of unions for life partnership 
properly deserve to be accorded the title of “marriage”—instead sidesteps this 
contentious issue by “getting out of the marriage business” altogether.
 Less commonly observed, however, is the fact that there are two competing 
models for how the state might effect a regime of disestablished marriage. On the 
one hand, there is a “deflationary” approach, on which the state ceases to confer 
marital status: the sanctification of life partnerships as “marriages” is wholly 
devolved to the private sector (a question for churches, synagogues, and mosques 
to decide, rather than legislatures and courts). But the state does remain in the 
status-conferring business. For on this approach, the state would still bestow a 
certain “thinner,” more “neutral” legal status—as it does when it creates civil 
unions, for instance. In recognition of the fact that this approach retains the use 
of public, legal status to recognize certain caregiving domestic partnerships, we 
might term this the “Status Model” of disestablished marriage.
 On the other hand, there is an “eliminativist” approach, on which the state 
ceases to confer any sort of status at all—not even the thin or neutral status of 
“civilly united.” There simply are no publicly registered domestic partnerships. 
What there is, is contract law, and individuals entering into contracts for life part-
nership—contractual arrangements that might assume any of a wide variety of 
forms. As with any sort of contractual relationship, the state acts as a third-party 
enforcer to these life-partnership contracts—this is its only involvement with the 
institution of marriage. As on the Status Model, of course, private individuals 
and institutions remain entitled to perform whatever marriage rites or ceremonies 
they wish. In recognition of the fact that this approach dispenses with the use of 
public legal status altogether, and relies (for the regulation of caregiving domestic 
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partnership arrangements) solely on the resources provided by extant contract 
law, we might term this the “Contract Model” of disestablished marriage.2
 In this paper, I explore the merits of these competing models. After briefly dis-
cussing what it means to speak of “disestablishing marriage,” and examining the 
case for disestablishment, I proceed to consider the advantages and disadvantages 
of each model. My tentative conclusion is that the Contract Model is the one that 
best instantiates cardinal liberal virtues.
1. Disestablished Marriage?
What does it mean, precisely, to speak of marriage as being “established” or 
“disestablished”? As is probably already clear, the language of (dis)establishment 
is borrowed from US constitutional law, where it is used to describe the state’s 
proper stance with respect to religion. The First Amendment to the US Consti-
tution begins with the stipulation that “Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion”; this has come to be known as the “Establishment 
Clause.” Just as the framers of the Constitution recognized the wisdom of barring 
the state’s endorsing one among several contested conceptions of religious truth, 
so too do contemporary marriage disestablishmentarians commend the prudence of 
the state’s refraining from endorsing any of several competing ideals of marriage.
 To urge marriage’s being disestablished, of course, implies that it is currently 
established. How plausible is this claim? Here, I cannot hope to improve upon 
Tamara Metz’s discussion of the topic, so I shall quote her at length:
I use the term [“established marriage”] to refer to a historically specific ar-
rangement where the state actively controls, privileges and utilizes a specific 
account of marriage to regulate the intimate and caregiving lives of its citizens. 
To say that marriage is established is to imply that citizens hold deeply diver-
gent views of what marriage is and how intimate life ought to be arranged. . . . 
In this context, to define and promote “marriage” is to privilege one version 
of the institution over all others.
This “privileging of one version of the institution over all others” manifests itself 
in a variety of ways:
The state establishes its preferred version of marriage by providing exclusive 
material, legal and expressive benefits to those who (may) opt for marital 
status, and by punishing those who violate the norms embodied in the status.3
That the state punishes those who violate publicly promulgated marriage norms 
may not seem obvious at first, but Metz elicits a host of examples: historical ex-
amples, like “the criminalization and prosecution of polygamous and interracial 
marriage,” and more contemporary examples, like that of Mormon polygamist 
Tom Green. Of Green, Metz writes: “Although he and his many wives claimed to 
be married under religious but not legal authority, Green received a 5-year prison 
term for his hubris. So vital is final control of the label that even non-legal use 
of the marital appellation, it appears, is unacceptable.”4 More recent examples 
include British Columbia’s (failed) prosecution of Mormon polygamists in 2009, 
and a Utah county’s 2011–2012 investigation of the family of Kody Smith, stars 
of the popular reality television show Sister Wives.
 Later, Metz writes that
[j]ust as the “establishment of religion” refers to the state’s involvement in 
defining, inculcating and reproducing a particular religious worldview and 
institution, so the “establishment of marriage” highlights the state’s integral 
role in reproducing and relying on belief in a particular comprehensive account 
and institutional form of intimate life and its tie to the community.5
 As noted at the outset, the principal virtue of disestablishmentarianism is its 
elegant solution to the dilemma currently posed to liberalism by proposals to 
“legalize” same-sex civil marriage.6 In what way do proposals to amend7 the 
current institution of civil marriage, so as to include same-sex unions along 
with heterosexual ones, pose a dilemma for liberalism? That there is a dilemma 
here can best be seen by casting the issue in terms of liberal neutrality. For on 
any of the common contemporary specifications of the ideal of neutrality (viz., 
neutrality of justification, neutrality of effect), it is clear that there is no resolu-
tion to this controversy that remains neutral with respect to citizens’ competing 
understandings of the proper nature and scope of the institution of civil marriage. 
Whether individual states and/or the federal government8 retain the institution 
of marriage in its present form, or extend it to include same-sex unions, their 
policies will certainly run afoul of the deeply held beliefs and values reasonably 
(we may suppose) held by broad swaths of their citizenries.9 The appeal of dis-
establishmentarianism, then, is that it offers a “third way” that goes right through 
the horns of this dilemma. By quitting the field of marriage policy altogether, and 
getting out of the business of determining which unions are legitimately certifi-
able as “marriages,” the state does have a way to remain neutral with respect to 
its citizens’ contested visions of the institution.10
 A further virtue of disestablishmentarianism will appeal to those whose animat-
ing concern is less the preservation and protection of the state’s liberal credentials 
(viz., its fairness, its neutrality), and more the preservation and protection of the 
institution of marriage itself. To foreshadow somewhat, the analogy with dises-
tablished religion (developed more fully in section 5) is instructive in this regard. 
Many commentators have observed the high degree of religiosity in the United 
States compared to that displayed by citizenries in other Western democracies, 
and speculated that this fact is historically connected with American ecclesiasti-
cal disestablishment. Just as the vigor and vitality of religious life in the United 
States is plausibly associated with its history of separation from the state, so 
also might the health and vigor of the institution of marriage be improved by its 
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 being divorced from the state. Tamara Metz expresses the analogy thusly: “[I]f 
we follow the comparison to religion, history would seem to be on our side in the 
prediction that the unique expressive value of marriage would increase were the 
state to relinquish control over the institution.”11
 For these reasons, among others, marital disestablishmentarianism has gener-
ated considerable attention in the recent scholarly literature, from theorists of 
widely divergent political and philosophical perspectives.12 However, just as we 
find that citizens of contemporary liberal polities endorse competing conceptions 
of civil marriage—the very fact that makes disestablishmentarianism an appeal-
ing theoretical option in the first place—so also are we beginning to observe that 
disestablishmentarians themselves cleave into two camps, each with a competing 
understanding of what it means to “disestablish” marriage.
2. The Status Model
The first such group includes those we might term “Status Theorists.” Proponents 
of the Status Model argue that the state should abstain from conferring the status of 
married on any unions for life partnership. In its place, however, they recommend 
that the state still confer a thinner, more neutral status upon such partnerships—
for instance, the sort of status conferred when the state joins persons into civil 
unions. In this respect, Status Theorists advocate that the state take a deflationary 
approach to the legal status it confers upon registered domestic partnerships by 
“leveling down” to civil unions. Meanwhile, private institutions—most promi-
nently, religious institutions—would remain free to perform marriage ceremonies 
and rites as they saw fit, with some electing to recognize same-sex partnerships 
and others preferring to reserve the institution of “marriage” for heterosexual 
couples, as the case may be. This arrangement13 preserves the autonomy of such 
private institutions, while still extending the benefits of registered partnership 
to a wider range of persons. We may think of Status Theorists as recognizing 
the merits of two equally forceful claims—which nevertheless stand in some 
tension with one another—and as offering a compromise between them. On the 
one hand, they make the “Pluralist” recognition that marriage is a contested 
notion—subject to reasonable disagreement as to its proper scope and nature. 
On the other hand, Status Theorists make the “Public Endorsement” recognition 
that it is legitimate and desirable for the state to recognize, protect, encourage, 
and regulate (at least some forms of) domestic partnership, and that this public 
involvement with domestic partnerships should involve the conferral of certain 
benefits—material and otherwise.14
 Status Theorists further cleave into what we might term the “Conservatives” and 
the “Radicals.” Conservative Status Theorists wish, we might say, to conserve both 
(i) as much as possible of the extant legal apparatus already utilized to recognize, 
protect, encourage, and regulate domestic partnerships, and (ii) the only alterna-
tive legal status (alternative, that is, to marriage) currently in existence: that of civil 
unions. Radical Theorists, on the other hand, propose alternative arrangements—
alternative, not only to marriage, but also to civil unions—as the best approach to 
affording the public recognition that domestic partnerships require.
 Representative recent examples of Conservative Status Theorists include Tor-
cello (2008) and March (2011). Torcello offers us the “Marriage Privatization 
Model” (MPM), a proposal under which “the state endorsement of any marriage 
is inappropriate”; rather, “state authority must be confined to exclusively endorse 
civil unions for both heterosexual and homosexual couples.”15 Couples are still 
more than welcome to utilize private institutions to further certify their unions 
as marriages, if they wish, and no such institution will be forced to perform 
marriage ceremonies, or to recognize marriages, to which they object. Torcello 
bases his proposal on an appeal to Rawls’s conception of public reason—which, 
if taken seriously, “leads to the idea that the legalization of same-sex marriage 
may be just as unbalanced as its ban.”16 Andrew March, meanwhile, argues that 
“a liberal state should get out of the ‘marriage business’ by leveling down to a 
universal status of ‘civil union’ neutral as to the gender and affective purpose of 
domestic partnerships.”17 He specifically characterizes his view as a version of the 
Status Model (though he does not use the term)—citing as one of his background 
assumptions the position that “it is justified for a liberal state to recognize some 
forms of domestic partnerships or families in the first place.”18 As if to ensure that 
his reader understands his Status Model allegiance, March immediately proceeds 
to contrast his view with more “contractualist” versions (though again, he does 
not use the term) of marital disestablishmentarianism:
It is, of course, possible to imagine the argument that the liberal state gets 
out of the marriage business by getting out of it entirely—by extending no 
recognition or positive rights to families whatsoever beyond negative nonin-
terference rights. However, I am interested in the dilemma of a society broadly 
like existing liberal ones which is committed both to recognizing (and/or 
subsidizing) families.19
 Representative recent examples of Radical Status Theorists include Brake 
(2010, 2012), and Metz (2007, 2010). Elizabeth Brake advocates a legal frame-
work in which “individuals can have legal marital relationships with more than 
one person, reciprocally or asymmetrically,” with “no principled restrictions on 
the sex or number of spouses or the nature and purpose of their relationships, 
except that they be caring relationships.”20 Though two of the three terms in-
terchangeably used by Brake to refer to her proposal utilize a form of the word 
“marriage” (“marital pluralism” and “minimal marriage”), it is clear from her 
third term (“disestablishment”21) that her proposal is best understood as a ver-
sion of marital disestablishmentarianism, and not as an inflationary argument for 
simply expanding the current institution so as to include same-sex and polyga-
mous unions. This is further made clear by Brake’s insistence that “[m]inimal 
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marriage would also reduce the marital rights available”: “many current marital 
rights would be eliminated in an ideal liberal society,” which would not provide 
health care, basic income, or “economic assistance on the assumption of depen-
dency between spouses.”22 Even so, Brake’s proposal is not fully eliminativist: 
she allows that “there is a rationale within public reason for a legal framework 
supporting nondependent caring relationships between adults,” and that “this 
framework is a fundamental matter of justice.”23 As such, certain legal privileges 
would remain: alone among the multitude of rights and privileges that character-
ize current marriage policy, minimal marriage “would consist only in the rights 
which recognize (e.g., status designation, burial rights, bereavement leave) and 
support (e.g., immigration rights, caretaking leave) caring relationships.”24 The 
retention of these two categories of rights, furthermore, demonstrates that—while 
fully in the disestablishmentarian fold—Brake’s proposal belongs to the Status 
Theorist’s camp, rather than to the contractualist’s:
Although I argue for reducing state restrictions on the terms of marriage, I 
also argue for retaining marriage as a distinctive legal category, and for this 
reason, minimal marriage is not the contractualization of marriage. Minimal 
marriage consists in rights which recognize and support caring relationships; 
these rights designate a status, and their content is accordingly standardized.25
 This position is taxonomized as a species of the Radical Status Model, fur-
thermore, on account of its proposal to regard marital rights as severable: under 
a regime of minimal marriage, individuals can
select from the rights and responsibilities exchanged within marriage and ex-
change them with whomever they want, rather than exchanging a predefined 
bundle of rights and responsibilities with only one amatory partner. . . . [It] 
would allow a person to exchange all her marital rights reciprocally with one 
other person or distribute them through her adult care network.26
Brake illustrates the contemplated severability of minimal marital rights with the 
example of Rose, who has distributed her marital rights across the members of her 
adult care network in exactly this way. She has formed a legal partnership with 
her (platonic) cohabitant Octavian, to regulate the terms of their shared property-
ownership; she has bestowed her employer’s health care benefits on her ailing 
Aunt Alice, who lives nearby; she has delegated powers of attorney, executorship, 
and emergency end-of-life decision making to her bioethicist kindred spirit Mar-
cel; and, despite all this, Rose still lives separately (and, presumably, at a great 
distance) from the long-term love of her life, Stella. Because “[t]here is no single 
person with whom Rose wants or needs to exchange the whole package of marital 
rights and entitlements,” the proposed regime of minimal marriage allows her to 
effect marital relationships with multiple partners, inasmuch as she “wants and 
needs to exchange some marital rights with several different people.”27 Minimal 
marriage “allows ‘traditionalists’ and romantic lovers to exchange their complete 
sets of marital rights reciprocally, while Rose and others like her distribute and 
receive marital rights as needed. Minimal marriage is a law of adult care networks, 
including ‘traditional’ marriages.”28
 Meanwhile, Tamara Metz advocates replacing marriage and civil unions with 
the status of “Intimate Care-Giving Union,” or ICGU. Noting that “care is essen-
tial for the survival and flourishing of both individuals and society,”29 and noting 
further that “giving care, especially intimate care in a market-based economy, 
is risky,” Metz concludes that, in order to “insure that intimate care is given—at 
all, and well—and that its benefits and burdens [are] distributed fairly, the state 
rightly protects intimate caregiving.”30 This the state does by instituting a public 
legal category of membership in an ICGU. An ICGU status
would look a lot like marital status today. It would afford legal recognition 
from which would flow various legal presumptions (i.e. lines of rights and 
responsibility), protection (e.g. from certain types of intrusion), and material 
benefits (e.g. tax benefits, etc.). As with marital status now, an ICGU status 
would be defined, conferred, and if necessary, dissolved by the state.
Because “a civil status expressly tailored to protecting intimate caregiving would 
be more appropriately crafted and accurate in its target,” and because this pro-
posed change “would benefit gender equality,” “[d]isestablishing marriage and 
creating an ICGU status would better serve equality, fairness, and care than do 
legal regimes currently in place in most liberal democracies.”31
3. The Contract Model
We may think of Contract Theorists as those who share the Status Theorists’ Pluralist 
recognition, vis-à-vis the reasonable contestability of the proper understanding of 
the institution of civil marriage, but who afford the Public Endorsement recogni-
tion less weight. Contract Theorists may come to their hesitance regarding the 
Public Endorsement recognition via either of several routes. They may believe, for 
example, that domestic partnerships are indeed worthy of some public recognition, 
support, encouragement, and regulation—but that the public purposes served by 
any sort of legal recognition are outweighed by the ills that unavoidably attend to 
the state’s endorsing, via its choice of “public partnership regime,” some subset of 
its citizenry’s conflicting understandings of the institution. Alternatively, Contract 
Theorists may simply deny that domestic partnerships demand any sort of public 
recognition or support, or to be otherwise enshrined in any sort of legal status. Yet 
other Contract Theorists may actually affirm a position articulated in section 2 
above: that—far from requiring public, legal recognition—the institution of mar-
riage (or of domestic partnership more broadly) is of such vital social importance 
that it must be sheltered and immunized from the dangers of legislative definition, 
judicial interpretation, and bureaucratic regulation.32 Regardless of their exact posi-
tion on the merits of public legal endorsement, these Theorists affirm an eliminativist 
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stance with respect to the state’s conferral of legal status in this domain. Existing 
contract law, they maintain, is sufficient for the task: the state’s only involvement 
in the institution of marriage—or of domestic partnership more generally—is to act 
as a third-party enforcer of privately drawn contracts for life partnership. Recent 
examples of Contract Theorists include Shultz (1982); Fineman (1995, 2004); Card 
(1996, 2007); Boaz (1997); Garrett (2009a, 2009b); and Baltzly (2012); the posi-
tion has historical antecedents in von Humboldt (1993), who defended it in 1831.
: : :
The views of still other writers do not fit neatly within the theoretical dichotomy 
of “Status/Contract.” While Robin West (2007) is best characterized as a Status 
Theorist, her view is worth considering separately inasmuch as she offers a 
model that is really a hybrid of the Conservative “leveling down to civil unions” 
approach, and of traditional civil marriage. On her proposal, civil unions are ex-
panded such that they are (i) available in every jurisdiction, and (ii) open (along 
with traditional marriages) to heterosexual partners, and even to non-conjugal 
partners as well. The cultural “market” is then left to determine which form of 
legal union (if either) shall prevail. West counsels proponents of marriage equality 
to adopt a two-pronged approach, wherein advocates pursue first a “legislative 
strategy”—namely, an effort to secure the expansion of civil unions contemplated 
in (i) above—and then a “cultural campaign” to encourage all parties—same-sex 
partners, heterosexual couples, and even non-conjugal partnerships—to exercise 
their civil union option when selecting a legal category to recognize their domestic 
partnerships rather than their marriage option.
 Sunstein and Thaler (2008), meanwhile, defy easy categorization. With the 
“science fiction” scenario that opens their paper, they envision a regime wherein 
a set of “default rules” is triggered whenever individuals enter into (otherwise 
personally crafted) contractual unions for life partnership. These rules govern, 
for example, the distribution of jointly held property upon the dissolution of the 
union, whether through death or departure. These default rules are just that, how-
ever—defaults—and can be overridden by the parties to the union, as they see fit. 
In describing this scenario, they mention both a generally Status approach, and a 
generally Contract approach, as alternative means of implementing this science 
fiction scenario—but endorse neither.
4. Competing Merits
Having surveyed a representative range of the disestablishmentarian positions on 
offer, we turn now to an evaluation of their merits. In this section I will outline 
several of the virtues and vices of each competing model, before hazarding (in the 
fifth and concluding section) the verdict that the Contract Model is to be preferred 
on grounds that it better instantiates cardinal liberal virtues.
4.1 Strengths of the Status Model
The Status Model has at least two chief attractions: what we might term the “Ease 
of Migration” feature, and what we might term the “Preserved Public Recogni-
tion” feature. Let us consider each in turn.
4.1.1 Ease of Migration
The first thing to note in favor of the Status Model is the ease with which we can 
effect the transition from the laws, regulations, and policies—of both public and 
private institutions—of the current regime of established civil marriage, to laws, 
regulations, and policies of a civil union regime. It is barely an oversimplifica-
tion to state that, in terms of amending extant policies, all that would be required 
would be to replace any appearance of the word “marriage” (in, e.g., administra-
tive laws respecting the provision of Social Security survivor benefits) with the 
phrase “civil union,” and perhaps also appearances of the word “spouse” with 
the phrase “registered domestic partner.”
 This picture is complicated for us slightly by the existence of those I previously 
identified as the “Radical” Status Theorists, who wish not only to eliminate the 
state’s use of the marital label, but also to reform marriage’s successor institution 
in various ways. Even here, though, the picture is not too complicated: typically, 
Radical Theorists wish to preserve intact many of the current legal features of 
civil marriage, and simply to “prune” the institution by eliminating others of the 
current legal arrangements. Radical Theorists typically do not—and this is the 
point that is salient for our purposes—advocate for the addition of a substantial 
body of new administrative law, or otherwise for a wholesale revision of current 
legal arrangements.
4.1.2 Preserved (and Expanded) Public Recognition
Aside from administrative convenience, though, the ease with which current 
policies respecting the institution of marriage can be transformed into policies 
respecting a new, more inclusive (but less morally loaded) institution of civil 
union points to another, more important, reason telling in favor of the Status 
Model. For much of the importance of the Ease of Migration consideration is 
inherited from the importance with which many33 liberal theorists invest current 
public policies respecting the institution of marriage in the first place. If the 
current state treatment of marriage were largely a matter of indifference, after 
all, it wouldn’t strike these theorists as quite so important that current state 
treatment of marriage be largely replicated in the new state treatment of civil 
unions. Instead, we would be apt to prefer whatever regime of civil union law 
might be transitioned to with the maximum convenience—irrespective of how 
disruptive such regime may (or may not) be with respect to civil marriage. But 
the current state treatment of marriage is not wholly a matter of indifference to 
those liberal theorists who believe, with Metz, that “[t]here are compelling lib-
eral reasons—beginning with the physical health and well-being of citizens and 
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the polity—for the state to recognize and protect intimate caregiving unions.”34 
And when it comes to effecting this role, these theorists believe, the state can ill 
afford to rely on private contracting: “[C]ontract . . . is an ill-suited mechanism 
for governing relations of intimate care and interdependency. Status—a pub-
licly defined and defended identity that carries (and invites enforcement of) a 
bundle of rights and responsibilities—is, however, well suited to the challenges 
of outside involvement in relationships of intimate care.”35
 The Ease of Migration consideration strikes us as important, that is, because it 
assures us that we will be able to preserve much, perhaps all, of the state’s current 
favorable treatment of marriage—a favorable treatment that Status Theorists ap-
plaud. And it assures us that this favorable treatment will be even more extensive 
than before, inasmuch as same-sex couples will now fall within its purview. Lastly, 
it secures this more widely distributed favorable treatment without implicating 
the state in a controversial value judgment regarding the proper understanding 
of the venerable institution of marriage. This accomplishment will be welcomed 
(though perhaps not enthusiastically applauded) by Traditionalists—those who 
oppose amending the current institution of civil marriage so as to include same-sex 
couples—as preferable to the legalization of gay marriage. And it does so without 
depriving Traditionalists of their revered institution of marriage: Traditional-
ists can still associate with institutions of civil society (churches, synagogues, 
mosques, etc.) that perform (full-blooded) marriage ceremonies, according to 
their preferred traditions. What’s not to love?
4.2 Weakness of the Status Model: Vulnerability to Abuse
Well, there is one thing not to love here, though it’s not immediately obvious. 
And that is that the Status Model of disestablished marriage presents certain op-
portunities for abuse—vulnerabilities largely (though not wholly) absent from 
the current regime of civil marriage. There are two stages in the explanation of 
how this danger arises. The first stage involves demonstrating that the status of 
registered domestic partner, or the institution of civil union, will likely have to 
extend, not only to same-sex couples as well as heterosexual ones, but likewise 
to polygamous partnerships. The second stage involves demonstrating that, once 
open to polygamous unions as well as to couples, the institution of civil unions 
is vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. To each stage in turn.
4.2.1 Civil Unions: Inclusive Enough for Polygamists
A full defense of the claim that if constituted so as to include same-sex unions, the 
institution of civil unions needs be constituted so as to include polygamous unions 
as well, is beyond the scope of this paper.36 But we can make two brief observations 
in support of this claim. The first observation is that seemingly any consideration 
that favors including same-sex unions along with heterosexual ones will likewise 
favor including polygamous unions as well. (To motivate this observation, consider a 
simple rights-based deontological argument for expanding civil marriage to include 
same-sex unions along with heterosexual ones. Consider further the application of 
this simple argument to the case of polygamists. If gay and lesbian citizens’ equal 
rights are violated by their exclusion from an institution open only to heterosexual 
couples, is it not the case that the rights of would-be polygamists are violated when 
the same institution is restricted to couples only? If the argument applies to same-
sex unions, it seems to extend to polygamous unions.)
 The second observation supporting the claim that the institution of civil unions 
will likely have to include polygamous unions is that seemingly any consideration 
that favors restricting civil unions to couples only, and barring any other form of 
n-tuple, will likewise also favor restricting the institution to only heterosexual 
couples. Thus, for example, an appeal to the “traditional understanding of do-
mestic partnership” as an exclusively two-person affair actually favors restricting 
the institution only to heterosexual couples—akin to an appeal to the “traditional 
institution of marriage.” For plausibly, there is no “traditional understanding of 
domestic partnership” that is not at the same time an understanding of it as a fun-
damentally heterosexual partnership—and one that is centered on the production 
and rearing of children, to boot.
 An alternate tack in this vein is a modified appeal to tradition—one that al-
lows that the heterosexual character of marriages, as traditionally conceived, is 
a merely contingent, historically conditioned feature, while its dyadic character 
is an essential feature. Thus, one could block the purported slide into allowing 
polygamous unions with an appeal to monogamy alone as the traditional central 
feature of all domestic partnerships—and one that must continue to be preserved, 
even if the time has now come to progress to a more inclusive understanding of the 
institution that permits the recognition and celebration of same-sex dyadic unions. 
Perhaps what is essential to the marital bond after all is (as Christian Coons has 
expressed it37) the promise to treat a single other individual (of whatever gender) 
uniquely among all persons; to love, honor, and cherish one other person, to the 
exclusion of all others, as having unique value in one’s world. I concede that 
this is likely the most promising approach to defending the legal recognition of 
same-sex partnerships without at the same time recognizing polygamous unions. 
However, it has at least two severe limitations. First, any appeal to tradition is 
beset by the difficulty that there is likely just as strong a case for the “traditional-
ity” of polygamous unions, as there is for the traditionality of two-person unions 
simpliciter (irrespective of gender). Second, one must be careful in deploying the 
“love requires regarding another individual as unique” maneuver. Consider, for 
example, the implications of this position for parents who have more than one 
child. Is the parental love experienced by an only child superior to that experienced 
by his cousins, each of whom must share the spotlight with his or her siblings? 
Does a parent’s love for her first child diminish when she has her second, insofar 
as she can no longer regard her first-born as being uniquely valuable? If we are 
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comfortable acknowledging the capacity of parents to manifest full parental love 
and devotion to multiple children—as we quite rightly are—we should at least 
be cautious of cavalierly insisting that conjugal love and devotion contrariwise 
require exclusivity.
 So, without further ado, let us consider the case to be closed: if civil unions are 
to be open to same-sex unions, they are to be open to polygamous unions as well. 
What of the second stage in my two-staged explanation of the Status Model’s 
vulnerability to abuse?
4.2.2 Inclusive Civil Unions: Dangers of Fraud
If the state confers certain legal benefits (e.g., tax breaks) on registered domestic 
partnerships, and said partnerships need not be restricted to parties of two, then 
what is to prevent opportunistic groups of three or more individuals from exploit-
ing the policies of a civil union regime for purposes of acquiring ill-gotten access 
to these benefits? In the course of defending his version of the Status Model, 
Andrew March considers this objection, which he articulates as follows:
In societies where the point of civil unions or registered domestic partner-
ships is to materially subsidize families in various ways, an objection to 
[including polygamous unions within the purview of these unions] could 
be leveled that the temptation for fraud to access these benefits would be 
great, or even that the costs of extending them to sincere families would be 
an unfair burden on others.38
To illustrate the worry, imagine a “household” consisting of five unrelated 
members—a house rented out to a group of graduate students, for example. 
What is to prevent these five householders—none of whom bear any romantic 
feelings toward any of the others—from joining together in a five-person regis-
tered domestic partnership—thereby securing ill-gotten access to, for example, 
the tax benefits that are intended to accrue to genuine households under a civil 
union regime—planning all the while to dissolve their “domestic partnership” 
once, say, their dissertations are defended, and they all go their separate ways? 
Call this the “Group House Objection,” in recognition of the temptation that 
such a regime offers to people thus situated. What the Group House Objection 
demonstrates is not that vulnerability to this sort of fraud and abuse is unique to 
the marital regime contemplated by the Status Model. Rather, it demonstrates 
that—by contemplating a maximally expansive and inclusive institution of Civil 
Unions—the Status Model also thereby greatly expands and broadens both the 
incentives and the opportunities for fraud and abuse.
 March endeavors (unconvincingly, by my lights) to demonstrate that inclusion 
of polygamous unions within the purview of a civil union regime will not pose 
undue societal burdens or costs in this way. An alternative response the Status 
Theorist can make here is that “it comes with the territory”: free-rider problems 
are pervasive, and are endemic to a wide range of worthwhile social policies. 
As the plot devices of numerous Hollywood romantic comedies and television 
sitcom episodes illustrate, even the contemporary institution of civil marriage is 
subject to such exploitation: people already marry for convenience, for insurance 
coverage, for pension benefits, for immigration sponsorship and residency status, 
and the like. That the civil union regime favored by many Status Theorists is like-
wise vulnerable is not necessarily a mark in its disfavor. One further response is 
to urge the erection of additional safeguards, to supplement the (less restrictive, 
more expansive and inclusive) institution of civil unions. Perhaps prospective 
partners could be required to produce independent evidence of their genuine 
commitment—not wholly dissimilar to the current US practice of affording extra 
scrutiny to the bona fides of couples seeking immigration sponsorship for their 
would-be spouses. Perhaps, for example, they must have a joint bank account, 
or jointly hold other assets.39
 But an even more forceful and obvious response is available: if the state confers 
no tax or legal benefits upon those it officially recognizes as having a particular 
status (viz., being a member of a registered civil union), then there are no benefits 
available to be exploited, defrauded, or ill-gotten. If there’s simply nothing “up 
for grabs,” there will be no grabbing. But this is just to say that the solution to 
the Group House objection to the Status Model is simply to embrace the Contract 
Model! So, having just identified one advantage of this competing model, let us 
segue into a fuller consideration of its virtues and vices.
4.3 Strengths of the Contract Model
As we have just observed, on the Contract Model of “privatized marriage,” the 
state does not confer any status upon persons attendant to their undertaking 
certain voluntary arrangements for life partnership. That is the first strength of 
the Contract Model—it will not be liable to fraud and abuse in the way we have 
just seen the Status Model is. Having observed this symmetry between our two 
models with respect to the “Vulnerability to Abuse” consideration—namely, that 
the weakness thereby attributed to the Status Model is likewise a (mild) strength 
of the Contract Model, insofar as it is immune to this weakness—let us grant the 
analogous symmetry between the two models with respect to the two strengths 
of the Status Model, discussed above. That is, let us acknowledge at the outset 
that two (mild) weaknesses of the Contract Model are that it fails to embody the 
advantages described in our discussion of Migratory Ease and Preserved Recog-
nition, above. But beyond these (mild) corresponding strengths and weaknesses, 
is there anything further to be said for, or against, the Contract Model? In the 
remainder of section 4.3, I discuss two further strengths of contractualism with 
respect to marriage—and, by implication, a further two (mild) weaknesses of the 
Status approach. In section 4.4, then, I comment on the two (mild) weaknesses 
of the Contract Model whose existence we conceded just above—offering miti-
gating considerations that seek to demonstrate that matters don’t stand quite so 
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poorly in these respects; that these mild weaknesses of the Contract Model are 
even milder than they first appear.
4.3.1 Historical Momentum (vis-à-vis the Status of Status)
Nineteenth-century American anthropologist Henry Sumner Maine famously 
observed that the development of modern legal arrangements out of pre-modern 
regimes is represented by the evolution from “Status to Contract.”40 Consider, 
then, just how odd a practice it is in the first place, for modern liberal polities to 
be conferring status on persons in the manner currently observed in the institution 
of civil marriage, and in the manner still countenanced by the Status Model. And 
make no mistake: conferring status—in exactly the manner that feudal systems 
of old recognized the statuses of “nobility” and “commoner”—is precisely what 
the state does when it deems you to be married (or when it recognizes you as 
a registered domestic partner). Following Anita Bernstein, Jeremy Garrett cites 
other forms of legal status that have been enshrined in law: “unsavory examples” 
including “the status of ‘wife’ under coverture law, and the classifications of 
‘subnormal mentality’ (including ‘moron,’ ‘low moron,’ and ‘idiot’).”41 It’s worth 
noting that under coverture law, wifely status “not only denied women access 
to property of their own but also, in important respects, entailed that they were 
actually themselves the property of their husbands.”42 As societies have advanced, 
industrialized, democratized, and (in a word) liberalized, the trend has been to 
eliminate these statuses as legal categories; persistence of a recognized legal 
status designating one’s membership (or lack thereof) in a registered domestic 
partnership would seem to stand athwart this long-run trend.
 But there is a difficulty here for the Contract Theorist: namely, to what extent 
does this anti-status argument generalize? Specifically, the Contract Theorist 
needs to confront the implicit suggestion that her invocation of this consideration 
commits her to the position that all legal statuses ought to be abolished. This is 
especially a concern for anyone who enthuses—as the Contract Theorist does—
about the resources offered by contract law as an alternative means to capture 
much (or all) that is worthwhile in our present regime of civil marriage. For con-
tract law itself—no less than bygone institutions and arrangements like that of 
nobility—presumes an extensive role for status. For note that there are many other 
forms of public status that hover in the vicinity of contract law—limited liability 
partnerships, for example. Does the Historical Momentum argument imply that 
we need to do away with these too? If so, the contractualist’s case—insofar as it 
relies on an appeal to the virtues or merits of contract law—may be undermined.
4.3.2 Informed Consent
Numerous philosophers, legal scholars, and feminist theorists have critiqued the 
peculiar “hybrid” character of marriage—as part contract, part pre-formed public 
status—as allowing (even promoting) members’ ignorance as to the fundamental 
terms of the contractual relationships into which they enter (as well as of the terms 
governing these relationships’ dissolutions) when they choose to marry. Jeremy 
Garrett has assembled a collection of these critiques, and I will quote liberally 
from his summary:
Anita Bernstein . . . [notes] of preformed legal statuses in general that “legal 
consequences follow to status-bearers without consent; only a rare person 
who acquires a comprehensive status understands what it means before the 
label is bestowed” (2003, p. 133). . . . Barbara Stark puts the matter in its 
starkest terms, noting that civil marriage involves plunging “blindly into legal 
relationships” that partners “know little or nothing about” (2001, pp. 1479, 
1482–83). For example, many persons would be unlikely to know or appreci-
ate in advance that the rights and responsibilities assigned to legal marriage 
can change (and change significantly) should one move to a new jurisdiction. 
This fact can have important ramifications for numerous terms of the mar-
riage contract, including such important terms as property and child custody 
arrangements. . . . What happens, then, is that one’s status of being legally 
married becomes the dominant consideration, not the particular terms under 
which one contracted.43
 To illustrate the danger posed by the fact that your marital status is what 
travels with you when you cross state and national boundaries (rather than the 
contractual terms of the marital regime binding in the jurisdiction in which you 
originally tied the knot), consider Claudia Card’s discussion of the case of Betty 
Mahmoody. Ms. Mahmoody “found after arriving in Iran that she had no legal 
right to leave without her husband’s consent, which he then denied her, leaving 
as her only option for returning to the United States to escape illegally (which she 
did).”44 Garrett correctly diagnoses the problem here: “[T]he facilitating element 
is clearly the status component of civil marriage, which allows for substantive 
difference in contractual terms to be brushed over in favor of a comprehensive 
social identity.”45
 While the civil union regime favored by Status Theorists would inherit this 
difficulty vis-à-vis the uneasy hybrid contract/status character of civil marriage, 
a contractualist regime avoids it altogether. Instead, it
encourages substantive familiarity with the contractual terms under which one 
is agreeing to be bound, if for no other reason than the fact that one would 
be designing (though not necessarily creating de novo) the broad contours of 
those terms. This increases significantly the likelihood that the martial contract 
will be [in the words of Susan Moller Okin] a “fully articulated act of will.”46
Of course, apropos the Betty Mahmoody worry, a corresponding worry might be 
thought to arise under a regime of marital contractualism: namely, what happens to 
a couple (or other n-tuple) who draws up a contract in one country and moves to a 
second one, where the latter jurisdiction (for whatever reason) refuses to recognize 
the validity of their contract? Here, all we can do is to note that matters would 
stand no differently than they presently do with other types of contracts—and the 
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matter of transnational recognition and enforcement of contractual obligations is 
not unknown to scholars and lawyers. There is an established body of thought, 
and an institutional apparatus, concerning international commercial arbitration, 
for instance—see, for example, the United Nations’ “Project on Dispute Settle-
ment in International Trade, Investment and Intellectual Property.”47 This body 
of work could likely lend precedent (if others do not already exist) for navigating 
the sorts of challenges liable to arise in these contexts.
 As with the Historical Momentum consideration, however, there is a slight 
difficulty for the Contract Theorist here, and it is similar to the one that attends to 
that same consideration. To wit: the marital contractualist must be cautious about 
pressing this point too strongly, lest it undermine the general confidence in extant 
contract law that underlies her endorsement of it as a suitable alternative to civil 
marriage. Consider that ignorance of contractual terms seems to be ubiquitous; 
it is hardly a defect of marital contracts alone. To allege that contracting ought 
not to occur except in conditions wherein contractees are fully apprised of every 
term and condition of the contracts they sign, is to advocate for the disruption 
of a whole wide swath of human activity—not only the contractual elements of 
civil marriage. (The unconvinced reader is invited to consider whether he read 
every word of that last software license agreement he “signed,” or whether she 
read every word of the first lease or mortgage agreement she ever signed.)
4.4 Weaknesses of the Contract Model, Mitigated
The principal weaknesses of the Contract Model were first noted above, when we 
remarked that it cannot claim the two important advantages (if they are advan-
tages) of the Status Model. In this section, though, I offer some considerations 
that mitigate these concerns.
4.4.1 Preserved Recognition, Reconsidered (Or, Parental Status  
as an Alternative Means of Protecting Children)
Note that the Contract Theorist need not sacrifice all the advantages of public, 
status-like recognition of domestic partnerships, countenanced in our discussion 
of the Ease of Migration consideration above. The marital contractualist can 
concede that marriage policy is currently put to use, albeit clumsily, in serving 
worthwhile social goals. In particular, we can easily locate much of the appeal 
of official state recognition of partnerships—much of what Status Theorists like 
about the family, and much of why they are cheered that on the Status Model, 
lifelong committed relationships and families receive the same level of support, 
recognition, encouragement, and subsidization that (only heterosexual) unions 
now receive under the regime of civil marriage—in the role that such recognition 
plays in protecting and supporting children. But notice that the state can just as 
well serve this vital public interest—indeed, can likely better serve this compel-
ling public interest—by treating of the matter directly, rather than via the proxy 
institution of marriage (or registered domestic partnership more generally). If 
the protection of children’s interests constitutes a compelling justification for 
recognizing, encouraging, and subsidizing domestic partnerships, then it ought 
to provide an even more compelling justification for measures explicitly designed 
to encourage the proper care and upbringing of children. A system of state poli-
cies could be formulated that is more direct and less clumsy in this regard—and 
furthermore, these policies could easily be designed in such a way that they are 
not subject to the same (degree of) manipulation and exploitation that earlier (in 
section 4.2.2) we saw might threaten policies regulating the formation and protec-
tion of multi-member domestic partnerships. And what is true of child welfare 
promotion is likely true of other goals for which the institution of civil marriage 
serves as a proxy social policy. As Garrett puts it, “many issues now treated (often 
awkwardly) as issues in marriage law could be dealt with through other areas of the 
law (torts, crimes, property, etc.) and through other legal categories (parenthood, 
guardianship, personal service contracts, etc.).”48 Note, further, that even many 
Status Theorists support the separation or disentanglement of legal frameworks 
for domestic partnership and legal frameworks for protecting children.49
 Granted, domestic partnerships are socially valuable apart from their effects 
on children, and apart from the ease with which the institution of the family 
facilitates the raising up of the next generation. Observing that domestic partner-
ships have these non-child-rearing functions and values has been an important 
weapon in the arsenal of same-sex marriage advocates. Jonathan Rauch, for one, 
has forcefully urged that such partnerships serve to “civilize males” and to en-
courage the care of ailing mates.50 And granted, shifting our instruments of social 
policy from a regime subsidizing families—child-producing or otherwise—to a 
regime subsidizing parents (whether single, dual, or otherwise—though perhaps 
incentives could be built in to encourage dual-parenthood—or maybe simply 
“multi-parenthood”—over single parenthood) will cause us to sacrifice some of 
the policy instruments that might otherwise promote child-less domestic partner-
ships, with all their attendant social benefits. But it still might be worth it.
4.4.2 Ease of Migration, Reconsidered
When considering the putative Migratory Ease advantage of the Status Model, 
it is important not to underestimate contract law’s flexibility, and its historical 
performance in quickly and nimbly adapting to new legal and social realities. 
As Garrett puts it: “The law is a highly resourceful and flexible instrument with 
a rich evolutionary history of negotiating and solving a wide range of practical 
problems. Contract law, in particular, has dealt successfully with an impressive 
array of tough cases and seems quite promising for addressing [the Contract 
Model]’s potential vulnerabilities.”51 Legal scholar Anita Bernstein observes 
that contract law is already familiar with this subject: “[C]ourts today must 
construe cohabitation contracts, antenuptial contracts, separation agreements, 
 TWO MODELS OF DISESTABLISHED MARRIAGE 57
58 PUBLIC AFFAIRS QUARTERLY
child custody agreements, and other knotty bargains between intimate partners.”52 
There seems no reason to believe that, were marriage to be disestablished in the 
manner envisioned by contractualists like Garrett and Boaz, contract law would 
be any less flexible, nimble, and adaptable to a new social reality: that of pairs, 
triples, and other domestic caregiving n-tuples, drawing up contracts for life 
partnership—not de novo, but from a menu of customizable pre-set templates.53 
Considering the matter in this way lessens the impact of the Migratory Ease 
advantage of the Status Model.
4.5 Expressivist Arguments
Having completed the foregoing survey of the theoretical virtues and vices of 
each competing model, we must now, before turning to the matter of rendering 
a verdict, pause to examine one final argument. The “Expressivist Argument” 
might, at first blush, appear to support the Status Model over the Contract Model. 
Despite its initial attraction, however, this is not an argument to which the Status 
Theorist, upon full inspection, will wish to appeal. While it is not likely to be a 
weapon of choice in the contractualist’s arsenal either, Expressivism does perhaps 
bear more strongly in favor of the Contract Model.
 The Expressivist, for our purposes, argues that, in at least some cases, when the 
state defines and confers a pre-formed legal status, it thereby expresses the fact 
that there is a certain kind of special value in obtaining and brandishing that status. 
Thus formulated, this is a very general position; more germane to our purposes 
is a position we might term Marital Expressivism—the view that, in defining 
marital status as a pre-formed legal arrangement, the state communicates that 
there is special value in being married. Marital Expressivism is a familiar position, 
shared by nearly all contemporary disputants (of whichever persuasion) to the 
same-sex marriage debate. Among same-sex marriage advocates, it is explicitly 
defended by (among others) Wedgwood (1999), Cruz (2001), and Calhoun (2002). 
Wedgwood, for instance, articulates his Expressivism thusly: “[T]here is a basic 
inequality in the fact that same-sex couples, unlike opposite-sex couples, are de-
nied the marital status itself; and we must also argue that this marital status is an 
important matter, not a mere piece of legal flummery.”54 While all three of these 
authors are pro-same-sex marriage Marital Expressivists, Calhoun is perhaps the 
most explicit in her insistence that, not only is it important that gays and lesbians 
obtain full access to the institution of civil marriage (for expressive reasons, as 
well as others), it is furthermore important how gays and lesbians come to secure 
this access. She is, we might say, a Procedural Expressivist with respect to the 
marriage equality movement, in addition to being a Substantive Expressivist with 
respect to the meaning and import of the institution itself. Calhoun contends that 
“[t]he moral significance of extending rights is to a large extent a function of the 
sorts of arguments that get culturally circulated in the process of extending rights. 
. . . It is especially because it matters which arguments get culturally circulated 
that I think the positive arguments for same-sex marriage rights warrant careful 
scrutiny.”55 Specifically, for Calhoun, it is important that the process of reforming 
the current regime of civil marriage be premised on the notion that gay and lesbian 
citizens are in every respect the co-equal of their heterosexual peers, and have just 
as much right as they do to enter into the institution of marriage and family life; 
the reform must be conducted so as to emphasize and explicitly signal this com-
mitment to the full equality of gay and lesbian citizens. In contrast to the reform 
envisaged by the Status Model, reforming marriage along the lines contemplated 
by the Contract Model, it might be argued, does not express the full equality of 
gays and lesbians in the way that Calhoun urges. Expressed colloquially, we 
might say that the contractualist’s preferred reform of the institution of marriage 
expresses something like the following message to gay and lesbian citizens: “Do 
what you want; each couple is on its own.” Conspicuously, it does not say: “Gay 
people are as good as anybody else to enter into this highly revered institution.”56 
Call this the “Expressivist Argument”; it is sure to tempt many proponents of the 
Status Model. Why do I think it fails?
 The first weakness of this argument should already be apparent from the label 
I’ve applied to its prominent proponents in the preceding paragraph. That is, it 
is most naturally understood, not as an argument for the Status Model over the 
Contract Model, but as an argument for marital establishment over disestablish-
mentarianism. The argument, in other words, might be a Trojan Horse for the 
Status camp: by admitting its validity, Status Theorists may well be committing 
themselves to abandoning disestablishmentarianism after all, and favoring a more 
conventional “marriage equality” stance, which advocates for the inclusion of 
same-sex unions within the purview of traditional civil marriage.
 We might consider, then, a modified version of the Expressivist Argument—
one that is indifferent or ambivalent as to the expressive value communicated by 
specifically marital status, but which remains committed to the importance of 
the state’s maintaining and conferring some important pre-formed legal status to 
recognize, encourage, and protect intimate caregiving unions, and to generally 
express its approval of such unions. Call this position Status Expressivism, in 
contrast to the more full-blooded Marital Expressivism considered above. And call 
the argument that marital contractualism (unlike the Status Model) inadequately 
preserves the state’s proper expressive role with respect to domestic partnership, 
the “Status Expressivist Argument.” Even when its deployment is restricted to 
internecine conflicts among disestablishmentarians, though, the Status Expres-
sivist Argument fails to sustain the Status Model as preferable to the Contract 
approach. In the first instance, this is because the Contract Theorist is actually in 
a better position to appropriate the Marital Expressivist’s insight—and to deploy 
it to non-establishmentarian purposes—than is the Status Theorist. For even if it 
is granted that full equal participation in the institution of marriage is an impor-
tant expressive good, currently denied to gay and lesbian citizens, the Contract 
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Theorist can argue that this equal participation is better effected under the Contract 
Model than the Status Model. For under the former, all citizens—gay, lesbian, 
and heterosexual alike—have equal inclusion in the institution of marriage: an 
institution that is (newly) privatized. Expressed colloquially, we might say that 
the state’s transition from the current marital regime to the Status Model seems 
to express something like the following message to gay and lesbian citizens: 
“Hey, we can’t be calling your same-sex unions marriages—that’s a bridge too 
far. But, we also recognize that it’s improper for us to treat you unequally. So let 
us compromise, and call none of our officially sanctioned unions ‘marriages’; 
instead, we’ll call all of them ‘civil unions’—and we’ll let you join in on the ac-
tion! There—isn’t that better?” Plausibly, the message here is more demeaning 
than any that could be construed to attend a transition from the current marital 
regime to a fully contractual one. For the theorist antecedently committed to 
marital disestablishment, yet sensitive to the expressive dimension of the state’s 
choice of policy regimes in this regard, the Contract approach is likely to be seen 
as preferable on expressive grounds.
 Furthermore, there is an additional expressive dimension that must concern 
any theorist who, like Calhoun, is concerned to ensure that martial reform not 
instantiate expressive harm to gay and lesbian citizens: the worry of dilution 
with respect to the meaning of marital status. As we saw in section 4.2.1 above, 
once decoupled from its connection to the “traditional institution of marriage,” 
it will likely be difficult to contain the expansion of civil unions at just the point 
at which it includes same-sex couples along with heterosexual ones, without 
also effecting further expansion so as to include polygamous unions as well. 
Now, for many gay and lesbian citizens, this will not be problematic: they will 
not mind sharing in a (newly expansive) institution of civil union (or, for that 
matter, a newly expansive institution of civil marriage) that also welcomes into 
the fold their polygamously inclined fellow citizens—any more than many het-
erosexual citizens today would mind sharing in a (newly expansive) institution 
of civil marriage (or, for that matter, a newly deflated institution of civil union) 
that also welcomes into the fold their homosexual fellow citizens. But there are 
apt to be some gay and lesbian citizens who do so object—and to so object, 
precisely on the expressive ground that, in thus expanding the institution in such 
a drastic manner, the state has effectively “diluted” the institution of civil unions 
(or, for that matter, of civil marriage) to the point where it has been drained of 
any meaning it might otherwise have had. By making the institution so widely 
available, in other words, the state has undermined its very ability to make the 
expressive maneuver that the Status Expressivist finds so important in the first 
place. Expressed colloquially, we might say that the state’s transition from the 
current marital regime to (a fully inclusive version of) the Status Model seems 
to express something like the following message to gay and lesbian citizens: 
“Hey, sure—we’ll let in the gays and lesbians . . . and all the polygamists, and 
whatever other deviants wish to join the fold as well. Because, at this point, 
why not?” Plausibly, this is the message that many (gay, lesbian, and straight) 
citizens will find embedded and expressed in the state’s implementation of a 
maximally inclusive civil union regime; to the extent that this interpretation is 
reasonable (I take no position as to its reasonableness here), it is unclear that 
the Status Expressivist Argument can be sustained as an argument for the Status 
Model over the Contract Model.
 Of course, one might think that a similar worry arises for the Contract Model: 
insofar as, under a regime of marital contractualism, some institutions of civil 
society (traditionalist or fundamentalist strains of Mormonism, for example) will 
perform marital rites for polygamous n-tuples, one might conclude that a transition 
to the Contract Model likewise expresses a certain objectionable dilution of the 
institution of marriage, or of civil union. But there is an important difference here, 
owing to the distinction between the state’s actively promulgating and enforcing 
a certain legal status, versus the state’s merely tolerating the private control and 
distribution of an analogous, non-legal version of that status by the institutions of 
civil society. An analogy with sacraments may be instructive here: as a Lutheran, 
I may feel it an important matter of faith that there are but two sacraments—bap-
tism and communion. Am I concerned that my Catholic brethren’s conviction 
that there are fully seven holy sacraments dilutes my sacramental experience 
when, for example, I partake in the Eucharist? Most Lutherans are unlikely to 
feel that Catholic belief and practice expresses any disrespect or dilution to their 
understanding of the sacraments. Things would likely stand differently, though, 
were the state to contemplate getting into the business of sacramental establish-
ment. (By this term, I mean the state’s promulgating, encouraging—perhaps 
even enforcing—a position as to the number and nature of the sacraments. In 
one weaker sense of the term, sacramental establishment is already partially in 
effect, inasmuch as marriage is one of the Catholic Church’s seven sacraments, 
and is—as we have argued above—already established.) At this point, it might 
become a matter of great import for me which understanding of the sacraments 
becomes established—and I may indeed feel that the state’s endorsement of the 
Catholic teaching on sacraments expresses disrespect for my Lutheran understand-
ing. I may feel that the state’s establishment of all seven sacraments dilutes the 
importance I ascribe to baptism and communion. In similar fashion, the state’s 
tolerance of Mormon polygamous marriage under a contractualist regime would 
not be regarded as having the same import as the state’s including polygamous 
unions within the scope of its regime of civil unions.
 Having now dispensed with this initially promising, but ultimately faltering, 
line of argument, let us consider our survey of the terrain to be complete. Can 
we now render a verdict? In the fifth and final section, I hazard the conclusion 
that the Contract Model is the more promising of the two rival understandings 
of disestablished marriage.
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5. Conclusion: Contract Model More Congruent  
with Cardinal Liberal Virtues
So how do we adjudicate the conflicting visions of disestablished marriage, of-
fered by Status Theorists and Contract Theorists? It is methodologically too crude 
to note simply that each position has two major strengths (each one of which 
implies a corresponding—mild—weakness in its rival) and call it a draw. It is 
too crude still to take note of further nuances—for example, the fact that we’d 
identified one major weakness of the Status Model (Vulnerability to Abuse), 
and no corresponding major weakness in the Contract Model; or the fact that the 
Contract Model just may be able to claim a version of the Expressivist Argument 
as a consideration in its favor; or the fact that sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 offered 
considerations that mitigated the Contract Model’s mild weaknesses, implied by 
its rival’s corresponding strengths—and on this basis declare the Contract Model 
the victor. Nevertheless, I will hazard that, as an intuitive matter, the balance of 
reasons does favor the Contract Model. And to further motivate this intuitive 
assessment of the reasons’ balance, I conclude by drawing an instructive anal-
ogy with another important institution that (in the United States at least) is fully 
disestablished: religion.
 Notice what disestablished religion means in the US context: it is not as if 
there is some neutral public status of religionist, which people can register for 
if they wish. Imagine such a state for a moment: certain public, legal benefits 
would be available to persons who self-identify as religionists (though to qualify, 
citizens need not—since this is a neutral state, with “disestablished” religion—be 
of any particular religious affiliation), but not for non-religionists. To qualify as 
a religionist, one would simply need to publicly avow acceptance of, or com-
mitment to, one or another faith from a predetermined “menu” of religions—a 
menu maintained by the state. Most liberal theorists would think it ludicrous—
not least because it would be liable to manipulation and abuse—to confer legal 
rights and benefits on religionists in this way—even were the state to vigilantly 
maintain its neutrality when it comes to defining who counts as a religionist.57 
No: in the domain of religion, our regime of disestablishment falls squarely under 
the “privatization” model. Note, though, that in defending the state’s use of civil 
unions, Status Theorists are defending a regime of disestablished marriage nearly 
perfectly analogous to the just-contemplated regime of civil religion. Liberals 
who believe the Status Model provides the most natural or defensible vision for a 
regime of disestablished marriage, then, should take pause at just how unnatural 
and indefensible a regime of civil religion appears, when contrasted with our 
current regime of fully privatized religious affiliation.
 Or consider the same analogy with disestablished religion, in a slightly dif-
ferent way. To conclude our discussion in the same manner in which Sunstein 
and Thaler opened their 2008 article “Privatizing Marriage,” imagine a “science 
fiction” scenario wherein a state (similar in other respects to the United States) 
has a completely state-dominated established religion. Now imagine that that 
state decides, in effect: “It is now obvious to us that the US model has proven 
historically victorious, and so we are going to emulate it—we shall disestab-
lish our religion.” How would it be most natural for this state to proceed? By 
saying: “So here is what we are going to have, in lieu of our current regime of 
established, state-sponsored religion: we shall specify a generic, neutral status 
of ‘religious,’ and confer it upon persons who affiliate with a religious tradi-
tion—any religious tradition (within the broad confines we determine). We will 
make certain benefits available to these publicly-registered religionists”? Or by 
saying, rather: “Individuals are now free to associate with whatever religious 
organization they choose, or none at all. It will simply be of no concern to the 
state what they do in this regard, henceforth”? Does not the latter approach seem 
a much more natural and defensible way to disestablish one’s state religion? But 
if so, how can one defend, as the best way to disestablish marriage, an approach 
so closely analogous to the former?
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